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APOLLO EXPERIENCE REPORT 
THERMAL PROTECT1 ON SUBSYSTEM 
B y  James E. Pavlosky and L e s l k G .  St. Leger 
Lyndon B . Johnson  Space Center 
SUMMARY 
The Apollo thermal protection subsystem was designed to protect the command 
module during entry at lunar-return velocities. Discussed in this report are the major 
activities associated with the design, development, and flight testing of the subsystem 
and the significant technical and management decisions that evolved during the program. 
An extensive ground-based test development program in plasma a r c  heated facilities 
w a s  conducted to characterize the ablator thermal performance, followed by full- scale 
thermal-vacuum tests  at  the NASA Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center and a comprehen- 
sive unmanned flight test program. Continuous efforts were made during the develop- 
ment of the Apollo thermal protection subsystem to reduce the weight of the subsystem; 
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these efforts led to the reduction in ablator material density f rom 66 to 31 lb/ft , 
but the total subsystem weight always trended upward. The thermal protection subsys- 
tem performed well on all operational lunar missions, and no anomalies requiring post- 
flight investigation were recorded. It is concluded that an adequate technology now 
exists to permit the efficient design of ablative heat shields for entry at  lunar-return 
velocities. 
INTRODUCTION 
The Apollo Program was the third in  a ser ies  of manned space programs under- 
taken by the United States, and the Apollo command module (CM) was  the f i r s t  manned 
spacecraft designed to return to the earth from the moon. Project Mercury and the 
Gemini Program, which preceded the Apollo Program, were earth-orbital missions 
that resulted in atmospheric entry velocities of 26 000 ft/sec (inertial). The lunar- 
return trajectory of the Apollo spacecraft resulted in an atmospheric entry velocity of 
36 333 ft/sec (inertial), which created an aerodynamic heating environment approxi- 
mately four t imes as severe as that experienced by the Mercury and Gemini spacecraft. 
In addition, the deep-space and lunar environments imposed stringent thermal-control 
requirements on the Apollo spacecraft. 
The precise definition of the entry thermal environment and the design of a heat 
shield to protect the entry module from the greatly increased heating environment were 
a r e a s  of pr imary technical concern in  the design of the Apollo CM. A brief summary 
of the design, development, and testing of the Apollo thermal protection subsystem 
(TPS) and a discussion of the significant technical and management decisions that 
evolved during the program a r e  given in this report. The Apollo spacecraft flew on 
numerous earth-orbital and lunar-landing missions, and there were no problems or 
anomalies associated with the TPS. The success of the system can be attributed to the 
somewhat conservative design philosophy that was adopted and to the rigorous analytical 
and test certification requirements that were imposed. The report  is concluded with 
some observations on design requirements and ablator performance. 
THERMAL PROTECT1 ON DES I GN REQU I REMENTS 
The Apollo CM TPS was designed to protect the CM during entry into the earth 
atmosphere at lunar- return velocities. The induced thermal environment resulting 
from such an  entry necessitates the installation of a heat-shield material on the CM. 
Such material must be capable of sustaining (without excessive erosion) the tempera- 
tures  caused by the high heating rates on the blunt face of the entry vehicle and must 
also provide insulation to minimize excessive substructure temperatures. 
Early in 1961, a set of entry trajectories was developed by North American Rock- 
well (NR) that w a s  based on a lift-to-drag ratio (L/D) of 0 .5  at a t r im  angle of attack 
of 33", a lunar-return speed of 36 333 ft/sec, and an entry along a flightpath inclined 
40" to the equator. From this set of trajectories, two trajectories that formed a pre- 
scribed entry corridor were selected to s ize  the heat shield. The two trajectories 
(fig. 1 )  initially selected for  TPS design were called Block I. The overshoot boundary, 
designated HSE- 3A, was limited to a 5000-nautical-mile range and used aerodynamic 
lift for a "skip-out" flightpath that maximized the heat load. The undershoot boundary, 
designated HSE-6, was of short duration to maximize the heating rate and was predicated 
on a 20g deceleration limit based on a biomedical constraint. In addition, the Block I 
design required that the ablator sizing include the effects of the heating environment 
during ascent flight (with no specific temperature limit imposed) and the thermal envi- 
Figure 1. - Block I and I1 design entry 
trajectories. 
ronment in space. In space, the tempera- 
ture requirements for the ablator were 
limited to a cold temperature of -260" F 
and a hot temperature of 250" F. 
imum initial bondline temperature at the 
start of entry was specified as 250" F, and 
the limiting temperatures at splashdown 
were 600" F at  the interface of the ablator 
and the stainless-steel honeycomb structure 
and 200" F for  the aluminum-honeycomb 
pressure  - ve s sel structure. 
The max- 
In the f a l l  of 1963, the development of 
the CM was such that numerous weight- 
saving refinements in the design and new 
operational logic in the program dictated 
the need for a design change. This change, 
called the Block I1 design, provided an 
opportunity to resize the TPS. A guidance 
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and control system had been established that could control the entry of the CM by lift 
modulation (in conjunction with a skip-out) to achieve the desired range. Packaging of 
the internal components in the CM to obtain a center-of-gravity offset sufficient for a 
33" angle of attack could not be maintained, and the angle of attack w a s  reduced to 28" 
The requirement fo r  ranging was reduced from a maximum of 5000 nautical miles to a 
maximum of 3500 nautical miles, which included 1000 nautical miles of maneuvering 
capability for  weather avoidance. Because of the improved guidance system and reduced 
ranging requirements, the design entry boundaries were altered and a new set of design 
trajectories w a s  generated. The new trajectories were based on a maximum L/D of 
0.4, an initial entry angle of -5.20" to -9.45" to the horizon at 400 000 feet, and an 
increase in weight of the CM from 9500 to 11 500 pounds. 
The Block 11 design trajectories are also shown in figure 1. The HL-1 overshoot 
trajectory skips out to a higher altitude than the corresponding Block I trajectory, but 
the entry time and the integrated heat load were reduced considerably. The HR-1 under- 
shoot trajectory significantly increased the heating rate over that for Block I, but the 
corresponding heat-load change w a s  insignificant. A summary comparison of the 
Block I and Block 11 entry design parameters is shown in table I. Additional Block I1 
design requirements included a reduction in the ablator temperature extremes in space 
to f 150" F (with a limit of 250" F for 30 minutes during lunar orbit), and initial bond- 
line temperatures before entry of 150" F for the conical heat shield and 130" F for the 
aft heat shield. During entry, the bondline temperatures on the aft heat shield and crew 
compartment heat shield were limited to 600" F at any time before main parachute de- 
ployment, and the bondline design temperature of the forward compartment heat shield 
was limited to 600" F any time before jettisoning. The boost heating requirements for 
the heat shield were eliminated by the installation of a boost protective cover over the 
CM. The cover is jettisoned along with the launch escape tower 200 seconds after 
lift-off. 
TABLE I. - APOLLO ENTRY DESIGN PARAMETERS 
P a r a m e t e r  
L/D 
Maximum decelerat ion,  g 
Entry velocity, iner t ia l ,  f t / sec  
Orbi t  inclination to equator, deg 
Atmosphere proper t ies  
Maximum down-range dis tance,  n. mi 
CM weight, l b  - 
aNot applicable. 
Block I design 
Undershoot HSE-6 
0 .5  
20 
36 333 
40 
1959 ARDCb 
NA 
9500 
Overshoot HSE-3A 
0. 5 
N A ~  
36 333 
40 
1959 ARDCb 
5000 
9 500 
Block 11 design 
Jndershoot HR-1 
0.4 
20 
36 333 
40 
1962 s tandardc 
NA 
11 500 
Overshoot HL-1 
0.4 
NA 
36 333 
40 
1962 standard' 
3500 
11 500 
bAir Resea rch  and Development Corporat ion.  
'U. S. standard a tmosphe re .  
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THERMAL PROTECTION SUBSYSTEM DESCRI PTION 
The external shape of the Apollo CM (fig. 2), like the Mercury (ref. 1) and Gemini 
spacecraft (ref. 2), consists of a blunt entry face with a conical afterbody that was de- 
signed to minimize convective heating during atmospheric entry. The center of gravity 
of the CM is offset from the axis of symmetry to generate the necessary lift to satisfy 
entry corridor and range requirements. 
The TPS comprises the entire outer shell of the CM and consists of an ablator 
bonded to a stainless-steel structure that is fabricated in three subassemblies (fig. 3). 
In addition to protecting the CM from the thermal environment, the outer shell trans- 
mits  the aerodynamic loads to the pr imary structure during boost and entry and trans- 
mits the hydrodynamic pressures  to the pr imary structure during a water landing. 
Because of the uncertainties concerning the flow field during CM elitry into the atmos- 
phere of the earth, the magnitude of radiation heating, and the analysis of ablator-to- 
metal junctions, the decision was made to fabricate the entire CM TPS from ablative 
material. This decision was made, even though temperature predictions indicated that 
reradiative metal' shingles would provide sufficient thermal protection for  much of the 
CM conical afterbody. 
The ablative material selected for the TPS is designated Avco 5026-39G and con- 
s i s t s  of an epoxy-novalac resin reinforced with quartz fibers and phenolic microballoons. 
The density of this .material is 31 lb/ft . The ablator is applied in a honeycomb matrix 
that is bonded to a stainless-steel substructure. The phenolic honeycomb is first bonded 
to the stainless-steel shell with HT-424 adhesive, and then the ablator is inserted into 
the individual honeycomb cells with a hypodermic device that is similar to a caulking 
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gun. 
2500" F 7  
Sur face  
tempera tu res  
Relative w ind  - 
Forward  h e a t  sh ie ld  
C r e w  compar tmen t  64- ------a-- h e a t  sh ie ld  
Aft h e a t  s h i e l d  
Figure 3. - Heat-shield substructure 
ass e mb li e s . 
Figure 2. - Command module ablator 
thickness. 
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The thickness of the ablator var ies  with the local thermal environment (ref. 3) 
and corresponding temperature profile, as shown in figure 2. Two typical c ross  sec- 
tions of the TPS and primary structure are shown in figure 4. Section A-A represents 
the stagnation heating a r e a  where the total heat load is a maximum and requires an 
ablator thickness of 2.7 inches. Section B-B cuts through the leeward side where the 
heating rates a r e  lowest and the ablator thickness is 0.7 inch. The space between the 
outer TPS shell and the cabin structure is filled with a low-density (3. 5 lb/ft ) fibrous 
insulation, TG15000. This insulation is used to reduce the heat transfer between the 
outer shell and the cabin wall during space flight and, in particular, during entry into 
the earth atmosphere. 
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2.1 
2.0 
0.8 
1.5 
1 in .  
in .  
--+ 
Aerodynamic - - 
flow --- 
Section A-A 
Aft heat shield 
side 
side 
Section B-B 
Forward heat shield 
9 in .  
5 in .  
33 i n .  
.5 i n  
Figure 4. - Structural arrangement of Apollo TPS. 
To accommodate the heat-shield deformations that occur because of the thermal 
extremes in space and entry heating, the conical section of the heat shield is attached 
to the aluminum cabin structure by means of a system of fiber-glass slip stringers.  
This attachment system (fig. 4) provides strain isolation between the inner and outer 
s t ructures  and reduces heat conduction from the heat shield to the cabin. The thermal 
control requirements for the spacecraft in outer space necessitates a relatively low 
thermal absorptance-to-emittance ratio of 0.4 for the surface of the CM. This low 
ratio is achieved with a pressure-sensitive Kapton polyimide tape that is coated with 
aluminum and oxidized silicon monoxide and that is applied over the entire external 
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surface of the ablator. The installation of a boost protective cover over the conical 
portion of the CM prevents contamination of the thermal-control coating and the CM 
windows by aerodynamic heating during boost and by the tower jettison engine plume. 
The boost protective cover, which is attached to the launch escape tower and is jetti- 
soned with the tower before orbital insertion, consists of a layer of cork bonded to a 
fiber-glass cloth backing. Details of the boost protective cover are shown in figure 5 
and are discussed in reference 4. 
In addition to the basic thermal environment design considerations, the Apollo 
heat shield also has numerous penetrations and protuberances fo r  the installation of 
components such as windows, reaction control engines, antennas, and vents, as shown 
in  figure 6. 
tions such a s  the recessing of the components and the use of densified ablators in local 
adjacent areas. 
Each of these discontinuities in the TPS required special design considera- 
Cover 
Inner structure I r e 0  
Brazed stainless- 
C-band antenna 
S-band antenna 
Figure 5. - Boost protective cover for 
Apollo command module. 
Figure 6. - Penetrations in command 
module heat shield (Block 11). 
FA B R I CAT1 ON 
The Apollo TPS consists of an ablator in  a honeycomb matrix bonded to a stainless- 
steel  substructure. The substructure is made up of three subassemblies (fig. 3),  which 
are referred to, respectively, as the aft heat shield, the crew compartment heat shield, 
and the forward heat shield. Each subassembly contains several  brazed sandwich panels 
that are welded together by NR using a tungsten inert  gas process.  A typical weld- 
assembly sequence for  the forward compartment heat shield is shown in figure 7. This 
subassembly consists of four large brazed panels and four tower-well fittings, which are 
f i r s t  welded together and to which the forward ring and panel and the aft ring are added 
to complete the assembly. 
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Brazed quarter  Dane1 
Welded cone assembly 
Welded quarter panel assemblies 14) 
Tower-well fitting 
Forward r i n g  
Forward r i n a  
J- 
Final weld assembly 
Af 
Welded assembly T 
Figure 7. - Fabrication of forward heat shield substructure. 
A total of 41 brazed sandwich panels constitutes a shipset for each CM. These 
panels were manufactured by the Aeronca Corporation under subcontract to the NR Cor- 
poration. The first several shipsets were made of PH15-7M0 stainless steel; however, 
the la ter  shipsets were constructed of PH14-8MO stainless steel  because of the better 
cryogenic toughness of the 14-8 material. 
After the panels a r e  welded by NR, the three subassemblies a r e  sent to the Avco 
Corporation for application of the ablator. The structure is first cleaned by scrubbing 
with an abrasive detergent slurry,  and a primer coating is applied before the bonding 
of the fiber-glass honeycomb with HT-424 tape adhesive. The fiber-glass honeycomb 
core sections are then fitted in place over the tape, and the edge members a r e  posi- 
tioned at the same time. The assembly is vacuum bagged, and the adhesive is oven 
cured at 325" F for  1 hour. Inspection of the bonding of the honeycomb to the structure 
is made by a nondestructive ultrasonic transmission evaluation. Any unbonded a reas  
a r e  repaired, and then the assembly is ready for application of the ablator into the 
honeycomb. This operation, termed "gunning, '' is the injection of the Avcoat 5026-39G 
into each cell of the honeycomb by means of a special gun developed for that purpose. 
The cylindrical cartridges containing the ablator a r e  dielectrically heated to 160" F 
and are inserted in the gun. When the nozzle is positioned over the honeycomb cell, a 
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solenoid-controlled air valve injects a blast of air into the cartridge and this entrains 
the ablator and c a r r i e s  it into the cell, filling it f rom the bottom to the top. There a r e  
approximately 370 000 cells in the honeycomb. A photograph of the gunning of the 
honeycomb cells on the forward heat shield is shown in figure 8. When all the cells a r e  
filled, the assembly is vacuum bagged and the ablator is oven cured for  16  hours at 
200" F; then, it is postcured for  an additional 16 hours at 250" F. Then, the entire 
surface is machined on a numerically controlled tu r r e t  lathe to the design-thickness 
requirements. The thickness of the ablator is measured by an  eddy-current technique 
at preselected points, during machining as a process  control, and after machining as a 
final acceptance measurement. The machined TPS is radiographed to detect any defects 
in  the ablator, and repa i rs  a r e  made if  necessary. Then silicone rubber gaskets a r e  
inserted i n  all door openings, and various details (such as bolt plugs, molded ablator 
pa r t s  for the abort-tower wells, and fiber-glass shear  and compression pads) a r e  
bonded in place. After completion of these operations, the main ablator is checked for 
moisture content. A layer  of thin, epoxy-based pore sea le r  and a moisture-protective 
plastic coating then are applied to the surface to ensure sealing of the porous ablator. 
Afte r  this operation, the final weight and center-of-gravity measurements are made, 
and the heat-shield subassemblies are returned to NR for  installation on the spacecraft. 
Before the CM is shipped f rom the pr ime contractor site to  the NASA John F. Kennedy 
Space Center (KSC), the plastic coating is stripped off and the thermal-control coating 
with an adhesive backing is attached to the CM. 
GROUND AND FLIGHT VERIFICATION TESTING 
In conjunction with detailed thermal and structural analyses, the Apollo spacecraft 
heat shield was certified fo r  manned operations by means of an extensive ground and un- 
manned flight test program. Three full-scale command modules (CM 004, CM 008, and 
2TV-1) were used fo r  the ground test program. The CM 004 vehicle (without the ablator, 
but complete in all other structural  and thermal respects) was subjected to a radiant- 
lamp heating test that duplicated, i n  real time, the predicted bondline temperatures of 
the heat shield for  the Block I overshoot design entry trajectory. The objectives of this 
test (February 1966) were to evaluate the thermal-structural behavior of the TPS sub- 
structure (including the windows and hatches and the strain-isolation attachment system 
between the heat-shield substructure and the cabin structure) and to verify the thermal 
capability of the TF15000 insulation to limit the  temperature of the aluminum wall of 
the cabin to a maximum of 200" F. 
Thermal-vacuum testing of spacecraft 008 and 2TV-1 was conducted in the 65-foot- 
diameter thermal-vacuum chamber at the NASA Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center (JSC). 
A photograph of spacecraft 2TV-1 inside this chamber, with one side of the spacecraft 
lighted by the simulated sun, is shown in figure 9. These tests subjected the spacecraft 
to the temperature extremes and the vacuum conditions expected in space flight. The 
solar thermal energy was simulated with 
carbon-arc heaters (fig. 9), and liquid ni- 
trogen in the chamber wall provided deep- 
space cold simulation. 
data on the expansion and contraction of the 
gaps between the heat-shield compartments, 
the integrity of the ablator when cold soaked, 
and a quantitative evaluation of the distortion 
of the crew compartment heat shield. 
These tes t s  provided 
Figure 9. - Space-flight-mission simu- 
lation tes t  (spacecraft 2TV- 1) in 
thermal-vacuum chamber at JSC. 
Flight test verification of the Apollo 
TPS was conducted on four unmanned space- 
craft. The test flight parameters  are given 
in table 11. The first two Apollo test flights 
demonstrated the performance of the TPS 
during entry into the ear th  atmosphere from 
earth orbit. The first of these flights, mis- 
sion AS-201, used the Saturn IB launch ve- 
hicle with spacecraft 009. The unmanned 
spacecraft was launched from KSC (Feb- 
ruary 26, 1966) on a suborbital ballistic 
flight that gave an entry inertial velocity 
of 26 482 ft/sec at a 400 000-foot altitude. 
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TABLE II. - APOLLO TPS FLIGHT VERIFICATION 
AS-201 AS-202 AS-501 AS- 502 1 
Booster 
Spacecraft 
Date launched 
Mission description 
Saturn IB 
009 
Feb. 26, 1966 
Supercircular 
entry with 
high heat rate 
Inertial velocity at 
400  000 ft, ft/sec . . . . . 
Relative velocity at 
400 000 ft, ft/sec . . . . . 
Inertial flightpath angle 
at 400 000 It, deg . . . . . 
Range flown, n .  mi.  . . . . 
Entry time, s e c .  . . . . . . 
Maximum heating rate, 
Btu/ft2-sec . . . . . . . . 
Total reference heating 
2 load, Btu/ft . . . . . . . 
26 482 
25 318 
- 8 . 6 0  
470 
674 
164 
6889 
Saturn IB 
011 
Aug. 25, 1966 
Supercircular 
entry with 
high heat rate 
Saturn V 
017 
Nov. 9,  1967 
Supercircular 
entry at lunar- 
return velocity 
Saturn V 
020 
Apr. 4 ,  1968 
Lower velocity because 
of launch-vehicle 
malfunction 
Entry conditions 
28 512 
27 200 
- 3 . 5 3  
2295 
1234 
83 
20 862 
36 545 
35 220 
- 6 . 9 3  
1951 
1060 
425 
37 522 
32 830 
31 530 
- 5 . 8 5  
1935 
1140 
197 
27 824 
aAll missions were unmanned. 
The entry trajectory for this f i r s t  tes t  flight was chosen to provide the highest heating 
rates and, consequently, the highest ablator-surface temperatures and surface- 
recession rates that could be achieved with the Saturn IB booster. The TPS performed 
well during t h i s  mission and qualified the subsystem for high-heating-rate entries from 
ear th  orbit. 
The second test  flight was mission AS-202, which again used a Saturn IB launch 
vehicle. This unmanned spacecraft was launched from KSC on August 25, 1966, for  a 
suborbital flight with an entry trajectory designed to give the maximum total heat load 
that could be achieved from earth orbit. This flight qualified the TPS for  this type of 
atmospheric entry. In addition to qualifying the system for manned earth-orbital en- 
tries, the AS-201 and AS-202 missions provided data f o r  correlation with the thermal 
analytical models used for  thermal-performance predictions at lunar-return entry 
velocities. 
The Apollo 4 mission (also known as mission AS-501) was the first flight test in- 
volving a Saturn V launch vehicle with a lunar module test article (LTA-1OR) and a 
Block II configured CM (spacecraft 017). The unmanned spacecraft was launched from 
KSC on November 9, 1967, for  a planned flight t ime of 8 hours 37 minutes. After two 
revolutions in earth orbit, the S-IVB stage was reignited for  a simulated translunar 
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injection burn. Shortly after the spacecraft separated from the S-IVB stage, the serv- 
ice propulsion subsystem was ignited for  a short-duration burn to propel the spacecraft 
to an apogee altitude of 9769 nautical miles. For approximately 4.5 hours during the 
coast phase, the spacecraft was  oriented with the CM hatch window pointed directly 
toward the sun. This attitude cold soaked the thick ablator on the side opposite the 
hatch and achieved the maximum thermal gradient around the CM heat shield. After 
the cold soak, the service propulsion subsystem was reignited for a long-duration burn 
to accelerate the CM to entry conditions that represented the most severe combinations 
of heating rate and heat load for the two extreme operational conditions that could possi- 
bly be achieved from a lunar-return trajectory. The entry trajectory resulted in an 
inertial velocity at  400 000 feet of 36 545 ft/sec and a t r im L/D of 0.365. The CM 
landed in the Pacific Ocean within 10 miles of the predicted landing point, 1951 nautical 
miles down range f rom the entry interface at 400 000 feet. A comparison of the 
entry heating conditions of this test flight (AS-501) with those expected during manned 
operational flights is shown in figure 10. 
The actual mission flown was very close to that planned, and postflight inspection 
of the recovered Apollo 4 CM indicated that the Block I1 TPS survived the simulated 
lunar return entry environment satisfactorily. Sufficient flight data were obtained to 
permit a thorough evaluation of the thermal performance of the Block I1 TPS. Tempera- 
ture data were within design limits for the flight. The response from the extensive in- 
strumentation was good, except for the heating rate measurements on the aft heat shield. 
Although the aft ablative heat shield w a s  heavily charred and temperature data indicated 
surface temperatures approaching 5000" F, the measured surface recession was l e s s  
than had been expected (based on ground test data) over all points on the aft heat shield. 
The Apollo 6 mission (also known as mission AS-502) was the second mission to 
use a Saturn V launch vehicle with a lunar module test  art icle (LTA-2R) and a Block II 
configured CM (spacecraft 020). This mission provided one further test of the TPS at 
lunar-return velocity. The only difference between the Apollo 6 mission and the 
Apollo 4 mission in regard to thermal confimration was that CM 020 had the Block II 
thermal-control coating removed and i t  was- 
to be completely cold soaked during the 
coast phase. The only CM change made 
for the Apollo 6 mission was that, for the 
first time, the unified crew hatch would be 
a par t  of a CM undergoing test flight. 
The unmanned spacecraft was 
launched from KSC on April 4, 1968, for a 
planned flight time of 9 hours 57 minutes. 
Because of a malfunction of the S-IVB in 
earth orbit, the service propulsion subsys- 
tem had to be used to achieve the pro- 
gramed apogee of 1 2  000 nautical Miles. 
Because of the resulting low fuel availabil- 
ity, the second firing of the service propul- 
sion subsystem was inhibited and the CM 
achieved an inertial velocity of only 
32 830 ft/sec at the entry interface of 
400 000 feet. The heating conditions 
Design 209 undershoot, HR-1 r 
m AS-202 besign overshm1,HL-1 A 
I I I J 
s 0 - m  a M 35 40 45xld 
(D 2 
Reference heat load, Btu/ft 2 
.- - 
x 
Figure 10. - Entry tes t  conditions for  
flight test  verification of Apollo CM 
heat shield. 
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achieved on this flight are shown in table I1 and figure 10. It can be seen that the ref- 
erenced heating rate was only about half that experienced on the Apollo 4 flight, and the 
2 total referenced heat load was 1 0  000 Btu/ft less. 
Apollo 8/103 AS-503 
Apollo 10/106 AS-505 
Apollo 11,407 AS-506 
Apollo 12/108 AS-507 
A p o l l ~  13/109 AS-508 
Apollo 14/110 AS-509 
Apollo 15/111 AS-510 
Apollo 16/?12 AS-511 
The unmanned flights provided test  verification of the Apollo TPS for  both earth- 
orbital and lunar-return missions. The measured data obtained f rom these flights and 
f rom the first two manned flights (AS-205 and AS-503) were used to correlate the analyt- 
ical models used for  the required certification analysis. 
ft/sec 
35 000 
34 968 
35 024 
34 956 
.~ __._ 
34 884 
34 996 
34 928 
35 502 
A summary of the actual entry conditions for the manned lunar landing missions 
(Apollo 8 to 16  missions) is given in table 111. A s  indicated in the summary, the maxi- 
mum down-range entry distance was 1500 nautical miles compared with the established 
Block I1 design requlrement of 3500 nautical miles. These results indicated a crew 
preference f o r  a shorter down-range distance. The shorter down-range entry distance 
resulted in a maximum integrated heat load of 26 500 Btu/ft , which is appreciably less 
2 than the design requirement of 44 500 Btu/ft . 
2 
TABLE In.  - SUMMARY OF ENTRY CONDITIONS FOR OPERATIONAL LUNAR MISSIONS 
I Entrv 
Mission/vehiclc relative, I 
Entry 
#elocity, 
inertial, 
ft/sec 
36 221 
36 314 
36 194 
36 116 
36 211 
36 170 
36 096 
36 090 
Entry 
angle, 
inerticl ,  
deg 
-6.48 
-6. 542 
-6.483 
-6.50 
-6.49 
-6.37 
-6. 51 
-6.49 
D. 300 
.305 
. 300 
. 309 
,290  
,280  
.290 
.286 
Range, 
n. mi. 
1292 
1295 
1497 
1250 
1250 
1234 
1184 
1190 
Entry time, 
s ec  
~- 
868 
871 
929 
81 5 
835 
853 
I78  
81 4 
Reference q, 
Btu/ft -sec 2 
(a ) 
296 
296 
286 
285 
271 
31 0 
289 
346 
. ~~ 
'Reference heating r a t e .  
'Reference heat load. 
SIGNIFICANT EVENTS AND DECI'SIONS 
Thermal Protection Subsystem Fabrication Concepts - 
Ti les Compared Wi th  M o n o l i t h i c  Ablator 
Reference Q, 
stu/rt2 
(b) 
26 140 
25 728 
26 482 
26 224 
25 710 
27 111 
25 881 
27 939 
The TPS concept submitted initially by NI? to design and manufacture the Apollo 
spacecraft consisted of ablative t i les made f r o m  phenolic-nylon material bonded to a 
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honeycomb-sandwich substructure made of aluminum. The substructure was to  be built 
by the prime contractor, and the design, fabrication, and installation of the ablative 
tiles were to be accomplished by a subcontractor. In April 1962, a subcontractor was 
chosen to supply an  ablative system consisting of molded tiles (bjpically l-foot square) 
of Avcoat 5026-22 ablator bonded to a stainless-steel substructure. At approximately 
the same time (April 1962), recovered heat shields from Project Mercury were found 
to have experienced debonding of the tiled ablative center plug. This fact, together with 
the uncertainty regarding the thermodynamics at the joints between the tiles, led to a 
general lack of confidence by both NASA and NR in the tile method of ablator application. 
Consequently, NASA instructed NR to conduct an alternative fabrication study of the 
ablator installation method being demonstrated successfully at that time on the Gemini 
spacecraft. The Gemini heat shield consisted of a fiber-glass honeycomb core filled 
with an elastomeric ablator. A s  a result  of this study, a lower viscosity Avco 
ablator (designated Avcoat 5026-39) was developed that could be applied in a monolithic 
fashion to a phenolic fiber-glass honeycomb having a cell size of 3/8 inch. The fiber- 
glass  honeycomb was first bonded to the stainless-steel substructure with HT-424 ad- 
hesive, and the indiviaual honeycomb cells were then filled with the ablator. Initially, 
the cells were filled with the ablator by tamping the dry ablator into the open cells, 
then curing the entire TPS installed on the vehicle. The tamping operation, however, 
caused considerable coiicern with respect to  quality assurance and the possibility of 
damaging the substructure. Finally, the ablative material composition was modified 
so that it could be gunned in a mastic form (fig. 8) into the honeycomb cells. Although 
the monolithic ablator in a honeycomb matrix did provide a desirable fail-safe feature, 
it also resulted in longer manufacturing schedules and required additional inspection 
procedures. 
Mater ia l  Selection for Heat-Shield Subs t ruc tu re  
Stainless steel was chosen in preference to aluminum for the TPS substructure 
because of the fail-safe characterist ics provided by a higher-melting-point alloy in the 
event of a localized loss  of the ablator. The PH15-7M0 alloy was the alloy originally 
proposed by NR because of its high tensile strength (Ftu M 200 000 psi  at room tempera- 
ture) and brazing compatibility. The initial heat shields were fabricated from this alloy. 
However, further investigations revealed that the material became brittle at low temper- 
a tures  and the fracture toughness was unacceptable. The temperature cri terion at this 
time for  spacecraft during space flight w a s  i-250" F. Because of this fact, another 
material  with better fracture toughness at -250" F was sought and the alloy PH14-8M0 
(vacuum melted) was selected to replace PH15-7MO. The PH14-8M0 exhibited out- 
standing fracture toughness throughout the temperature range of -250" to 600" F. 
However, it was a relatively new alloy and an extensive development period was re- 
quired to define the optimum welding and brazing process specifications. 
Thermal Protection Subsystem Weight His tory  
The ablative material initially selected in April 1962 for  the Apollo TPS was 
3 Avcoat 5026-22, which had a density of 66 lb/ft . The predicted TPS weight with this 
material  was  1684 pounds. Shortly thereafter, improvements (which included the addi- 
tion of microballoons) were made to the material so that, by the end of 1962, a 
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low-density version of the material (designated Avcoat 5026- 39, with a density of 
35 lb/ft ) was incorporated in the TPS. This represented a density reduction of 47 per- 
cent, but the corresponding reduction in predicted system weight was only 20 percent. 
The low rate of system weight reduction was caused by the inclusion of additional re- 
quirements (primarily the boost heating environment? which had been overlooked during 
the initial design phase. In the years  that followed (after 1962), some further minor 
improvements were made in the ablative material, which culminated in a material den- 
sity of 31 lb/ft ; but the predicted system weight for  the TPS continued to  have an up- 
ward trend (fig. 11). The upward weight trend and the causes (which have been t rue 
historically of all aircraft and spacecraft projects) can be attributed to the following 
factors. 
3 
3 
1. The continually increasing number of protuberances on the outside moldline 
of the vehicle and a resulting increase in the local heating environment 
2. The more refined analytical techniques that replaced earlier gross  
predictions 
3. The addition of more rigorous thermal-control cr i ter ia  as the spacecraft pro- 
gram progressed 
Because of management concern about the increasing spacecraft weight, an attempt was 
made in 1964 to reduce the spacecraft weight. The Block I1 design, which resulted from 
these changes, showed a decrease in TPS weight of approximately 200 pounds (fig. 11). 
This was achieved by (1) the elimination of the effects of boost heating environment by 
the introduction of a boost protective cover that was jettisoned with the launch escape 
tower (fig. 5), (2) the reduction in the down-range requirement from 5000 to 3500 nau- 
tical miles (which provided a more realistic operational requirement), (3) a reduction 
in the maximum initial entry temperature 
f rom 250" to 150" F (by the use of an ex- 
ternal thermal-control coating), and (4) the 
removal of some protuberances. 
-= 80 
Two other weight-saving modifica- 
tions to the TPS were incorporated in 1968 
and were based on recommendations by 
NASA. The first modification was the r e -  
moval of several layers of nylon from the 
soft insulation blanket installed between the 
TPS substructure and the aluminum cabin. 
The removal did not compromise the ther-  
mal insulation performance, was accom- 
plished without causing any schedule delays, 
and resulted in a weight saving of 64 pounds. 
The second recommendation (a simple man- 
ufacturing change) eliminated the applica- 
tion of the protective enamel paint that 
acted as a moisture barr ier .  Because the 
ther mal- con t r  ol coating sub se quent ly 
n 
20' 1962 I 1963 1%4 I 1965 ' 1966 I 1967 ' 
Calendar year 
lBoor 1700 r 
1100 lZml Predicted weight (Block I I  Block I (measured) Block II Imeasuredl 
lo00' I I I 1 I 1 )  
1962 1963 1960 1965 1966 1967 
Calendar year 
Figure 11. - History of ablator density 
and TPS weight. 
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applied to the ablator surface was also a good moisture sealer,  an extra  coating of thin 
epoxy-based pore sealer was applied instead of the enamel. This sealer,  together with 
the thermal-control coating, w a s  sufficient to  keep the moisture content in the ablator 
below the specified 2 percent. 
Experimental Research F l ights  
The test verification plans for  the Apollo TPS included full-scale flight testing, 
which began in 1966. To gain confidence in  the thermal prediction and design methods 
being used, the NASA Langley Research Center (LRC) proposed two flight-research 
experiments. The first experiment was the Flight Investigation of Reentry Environment 
(FIRE) project, the objective of which was to measure quantitatively the convective and 
radiative heating environment on a subscale (2-foot maximum diameter) Apollo configu- 
ration at the correct lunar-return entry velocity. The flight was justified because of 
the many approximations inherent in the aerothermodynamic theories and to substan- 
tiate the magnitude of the thermal- radiation contribution to the total heating environ- 
ment. The FIRE payload was launched from KSC on April 14, 1964, on a ballistic 
trajectory that resulted in  an entry velocity (at a 400 000-foot altitude) of 37 900 ft/sec. 
Measurement sensors included beryllium heat-sink-type calorimeters for measuring 
the total (convective plus radiative) heat flux and radiometers for measuring the ther- 
mal radiation from the shock layer. The data f rom these sensors  were relayed to 
earth by delayed telemetry after the radio-frequency blackout period. Although there 
were a few flight anomalies, with respect to perturbation in  the body motion, the FIRE 
experiment was a success (ref. 5). A comparison of the measured heating data on the 
spherical forebody of the vehicle with several different theoretical predictions is shown 
in figure 12. These data provided confidence in  the methods used for calculating the 
heating rates around the Apollo entry module. 
The second subscale experimental flight in support of the Apollo TPS development 
was also proposed by LRC and had as its objective the verification of ablation perform- 
ance at  the correct enthalpy and heating rates (corresponding to the Apollo undershoot 
design (20g) trajectory). The justification for the experiment w a s  that the high enthal- 
pies associated with the Apollo entry trajectory could not be duplicated in ground test  
facilities. An added fifth stage for the Scout booster was being developed by LRC, and 
the five-stage Scout vehicle was proposed for the launching of the test spacecraft (known 
as the R-4). The entry nosecap used for the experiment was a spherical dish with a 
spherical radius of 17.4 inches and a diameter of 11.1 inches. The entry nosecap con- 
sisted of Avcoat 5026-39G ablator (1.25 inches thick) bonded to a stainless-steel struc- 
ture, which simulated the Apollo aft heat shield (fig. 13). Instrumen@tion consisted of 
ablation sensors  and thermocouples. The R-4 spacecraft was launched successfully by 
a five-stage Scout booster f rom Wallops Island, Va., on August 18, 1964. To match 
the Apollo heating rates  at less  than lunar-return entry velocity, the fifth stage of the 
Scout vehicle was ignited late in the entry phase into the earth atmosphere, so that high 
heating rates occurred at a lower altitude. A t  the lower altitude, the heating rates ap- 
proximated those an Apollo vehicle would experience; however, the resulting free- 
s t ream dynamic pressures  on the Scout vehicle were three t imes higher than the 
pressures  an Apollo CM would undergo on entry into the earth atmosphere. The teleme- 
tered ablation-rate data f rom this flight indicated that the rates  encountered were much 
higher than had been expected, particularly during the later stages of entry, and, in 
fact, resulted in complete erosion of the 1.25-inch-thick ablative material. There was 
I 
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material flight test. 
much consternation as a result of these find- 
ings, and considerable analyses and testing 
were done to convince the Apollo Program 
management that the poor performance of 
the R-4 test  spacecraft was a characteristic 
of the Avco 5026-39 ablator at high aerody- 
namic pressures ,  but that the high pressures  
encountered in the R-4 test were not repre- 
sentative of the Apollo entry environment. 
From this, it can be concluded that, unless 
a development flight can be made in an  en- 
vironment representative of the t rue  envi- 
ronment, extraneous i ssues  can arise to 
cloud the results and cause unnecessary 
anxiety and work. 
Ablator Backup Program 
Late in 1962, concern grew'over the 
increasing weight of the Apollo TPS; i t  was 
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hoped that some other ablative filler in a honeycomb matrix might offer a weight advan- 
tage. Accordingly, the spacecraft contractor w a s  authorized to conduct a comparative 
study of the thermal performance and structural properties of five different ablative 
materials (including the Avcoat 5026-39). 
Corning DC-325, which was  used on the Gemini spacecraft; a General Electric elasto- 
mer  designated ESM-1000; the Emerson Electric Thermolag T-500-13; and a silicone 
material with microballoons and eccospheres that was developed by LRC and w a s  known 
as purple blend. The results of the study, which lasted 6 months and included extensive 
testing, showed there was no clear thermal-performance advantage and, consequently, 
no clear weight advantage to be gained by the use of any one material. In addition, it 
soon became apparent from the thermostructural t es t s  that the low- temperature require- 
ment of -250" F could not be tolerated by the elastomeric materials and, as a result, 
the Avcoat 5026-39 was  retained as the mainstream material. 
The four other materials were the Dow 
By the end of 1963, a renewed concern grew over data that indicated the possibil- 
ity of an adverse thermal performance of the Avcoat ablator when it was subjected to 
high aerodynamic pressures.  Therefore, another backup program w a s  undertaken for 
JSC by the Emerson Electric Co. , which used a lighter version of the thermolag mate- 
3 rial (known as T500-111) that had a density of 35 lb/ft . The material w a s  well char- 
acterized and was adaptable to the Apollo manufacturing scheme; however, no 
worthwhile thermal-performance advantage could be demonstrated. Also, the evalua- 
tion of the flight data from the Scout R-4 test in August 1964 finally eliminated the con- 
cern over the aerodynamic shear sensitivity of the Avcoat material and the backup 
program was terminated. 
Boost Protective Cover 
Originally, the Block I TPS included approximately 0.12 inch of additional ablator 
thickness to allow fo r  the charring that would occur during vehicle exit flight. In Octo- 
be r  1963, the Apollo Program Manager agreed to a design change that incorporated a 
boost protective cover over the conical portion of the CM (fig. 5). The boost protective 
cover was attached to the launch escape tower and was  jettisoned with the launch escape 
tower (ref. 4). The change resulted in the following design improvements. 
1. A reduction in ablator thickness and weight 
2. Provision of a cover for  the CM windows during boost, which eliminated pos- 
sible contamination of the glass by exhaust products from the tower jettison motors 
3. A thermal-control coating that could be applied to the outside surface of the 
ablator to limit temperature extremes during space flight 
The temperature extremes without a coating were of the order  of k250" F; and tes t s  
had shown that, because of the difference in coefficients of thermal expansion between 
the ablator and stainless-steel substructure, the ablator cracked i f  soaked at a tempera- 
ture  less than -170" F. 
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Water-Impact Capabil i ty 
Originally, the Apollo CM was designed to  descend on land, and a deployable aft 
heat shield was  attached to the CM primary structure by means of energy-attenuating 
struts.  In the spring of 1964, the primary mode of landing was changed f rom land to 
water, and the deploying mechanism for the aft heat shield was deleted because it was 
not needed for water landings. No modifications were made to the heat-shield substruc- 
tu re  to accommodate the water landing because it was believed that this condition would 
be no more critical than the 20g design entry condition. However, because the analyt- 
ical prediction of the hydrodynamic pressures  and the structural response of the vehicle 
to these pressures  was not understood completely, a qualification tes t  program w a s  
planned. The test plan included the dropping of full-scale test articles into a water 
tank from a pendulum r ig  to combine horizontal and vertical velocities. The first such 
test w a s  conducted on October 30, 1964, with a test vehicle designated boilerplate 28. 
The test conditions simulated a nominal vertical descent on three parachutes 
(V = 28 ft/sec) in combination with a maximum horizontal wind design velocity of 
28. 5 knots (48 ft/sec). The test resulted in extensive failure of the aft heat shield sub- 
structure and of the cabin aft bulkhead, and the tes t  spacecraft sank within 2.5 minutes 
after contact with the water. The subsequent investigation showed that there was a lack 
of understanding with respect to the landing cr i ter ia  and the magnitude of the water- 
impact pressures.  Therefore, the landing criterion was established on a probability 
basis  using a Monte Carlo random selection and a combination of the several  variables 
(wind velocity, wave slope, and so  forth). An extensive 1/4-scale-model drop-test 
program was instituted a t  the spacecraft contractor facility and at LRC to obtain realis- 
tic impact-pressure data. The aft heat shield substructure was redesigned to accom- 
modate the increased pressures ,  resulting in an  increased TPS weight of approximately 
230 pounds. 
V 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The Apollo spacecraft has flown on several  earth-orbital and lunar-landing mis- 
sions, and the thermal protection subsystem has performed well on all missions. The 
success  of the system can be attributed to the conservative design philosophy and rig- 
orous development and verification testing that was conducted. Experience with lunar 
missions has shown that the spacecraft crewmembers prefer short-range entries and 
that the command module can be guided precisely to the middle of the entry corridor. 
This results in a heating environment that is much less severe than that for  which the 
thermal protection subsystem was designed. Entry down range for  the manned lunar- 
landing missions (Apollo 8 to 16) was actually 1500 nautical miles for lunar-return 
entry, compared with the design requirement of 3500 nautical miles. The resulting 
maximum integrated heat load was 26 500 Btu/ft , compared with 44 500 Btu/ft which 
was used in the design of the thermal protection subsystem. 
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The following are other major conclusions derived f rom the thermal protection 
subsystem design and application experience. 
1. The change from the proposed tiled ablator to a monolithic heat shield initiated 
a lengthy development of a new manufacturing process,  and the ablator had to be 
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modified to permit insertion of the ablator into the honeycomb core by gunning. How- 
ever, the advantage of having the fail-safe features of a monolithic heat shield embedded 
in a honeycomb matrix overrode the disadvantages of extended manufacturing schedules 
and more costly inspection procedures. 
2. The down-range distance selected for the Block I design overshoot trajectory 
was 5000 nautical miles; this distance w a s  reduced to 3500 nautical miles for the 
Block I1 design. However, the thermal protection subsystem could not be flight tested 
beyond 2500 nautical miles, and the astronauts had difficulty ranging greater  than 
1600 nautical miles down range. A s  a result, the operational choice has been in favor 
of ranges l e s s  than 1500 nautical miles, which means that the thermal protection sub- 
system w a s  overdesigned. 
3. The various screening and backup programs during the Apollo thermal 
protection development showed that (a) current ablators of the same general density 
range (35 to 55 lb/ft ) have comparable thermal performance, (b) simple analyses do 
not form a sound basis for assessing the thermal protection subsystem weight, and 
(c) flight testing in  environments not representative of design conditions, as in  the case 
of the five-stage Scout vehicle with the R-4 payload, can be misleading and cause un- 
warranted concern i f  not interpreted correctly. 
3 
4. Thermal performance of the ablation material is only one of several cr i ter ia  
required to develop a thermal protection subsystem. Viewing the thermal protection 
subsystem as a whole, major changes were made in  the system to improve inspection 
access,  thermal s t ress ,  manufacturing, center-of-gravity control, and performance at 
singularities; however, major changes in  the system were not necessary to obtain bet- 
ter thermal performance from the basic ablator. 
5. Because of aerothermodynamic uncertainties associated with the many pene- 
trations, cavities, and protuberances that were required in the heat shield, many of the 
singularities were recessed into the ablator and other protuberances were located in the 
leeward regions of separated flow. All of these regions were designed with a fair 
amount of conservatism. 
6. An adequate technology exists to permit the efficient design of ablator thermal 
protection systems for entry speeds as high as those associated with lunar return. Con- 
siderable technological experience has been gained in the design, testing, and analysis 
of such a thermal protection system. Considering the critical nature of the thermal 
protection subsystem, the investment of time and money in extensive ground and flight 
testing is considered to have been worth the effort. 
Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
Houston, Texas, October 16, 1973 
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